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A bidding process can be organized so that offers are submitted simultaneously or sequentially. In
the latter case, potential buyers can condition their behavior on previous entrants' decisions. The relative
performance of these mechanisms is investigated when entry is costly and selective, meaning that
potential buyers with higher values are more likely to participate. A simple sequential mechanism
can give both buyers and sellers significantly higher payoffs than the commonly used simultaneous
bid auction. The findings are illustrated with parameters estimated from simultaneous entry USFS

















The simultaneous bid auction is a standard method for sellers to solicit oers from buyers.
A simple alternative is for a seller to ask buyers to make oers sequentially. If it is costly
for buyers to participate, the sequential mechanism will tend to be more ecient than the
simultaneous auction because later potential buyers can condition their participation deci-
sions on earlier bids. However, the sequential mechanism's greater eciency may not produce
higher revenues because while the possibility of deterring later potential entrants can lead
early bidders to bid aggressively, the fact that later rms might be deterred will tend to
reduce revenues. The relative revenue performance of the mechanisms will therefore depend
on whether the threat of potential future competition, which can raise bids in the sequential
mechanism, is more valuable to the seller than actual competition, which will tend to be
greater in the simultaneous auction.
The relative revenue performance of these alternative mechanisms has direct implications
for how assets should be sold. In the case of how to structure the sale of corporations,
this question has attracted attention from practitioners and other commentators since the
Delaware Supreme Court's 1986 Revlon decision charged a board overseeing the sale of a
company with the duty of \getting the best price for the stockholders" (Revlon v McAn-
drews & Forbes Holdings (1986)). In practice, corporate sales occur through a mixture of
simultaneous and sequential mechanisms, with sequential mechanisms sometimes taking the
form of \go-shop" arrangements where a seller may reach an agreement with one rm while
retaining the right to solicit other oers, to which the rst rm may be able to respond.1;2
Surprisingly, the only attempt to date to directly address this relative performance ques-
tion is Bulow and Klemperer (2009) (BK hereafter). They compare the revenue and eciency
performances of the commonly-used simultaneous bid second-price auction with a similarly
simple, sequential mechanism. In this second mechanism, buyers are approached in turn, and
upon observing the history of oers, each chooses whether to enter and attempt to outbid the
current high bidder. If the incumbent is outbid, the new entrant can make a jump bid that
may potentially deter later rms from participating. The incumbent at the end of the game
pays the standing price. As BK note (see also Subramanian (2008), Wasserstein (2000))3,
1A \go-shop" clause allows a seller to come to an agreement on an initial price with a buyer and retain
the right to solicit bids from other buyers for the next 30-60 days. If a new, higher oer is received, then
according to the \match right", which is often included in the agreement with the initial buyer, the seller
must negotiate with the rst buyer (for 3-5 days, for example) to see if it can match the terms of the new,
higher oer.
2There are numerous theory papers, some related directly to the eld of corporate nance, that consider
sequential mechanisms similar to the one considered here. Examples include Fishman (1988), Daniel and
Hirshleifer (1998) and Horner and Sahuguet (2007).
3Boone and Mulherin (2007) describe various sale methods for corporate takeovers and establish that the
2these simple mechanisms can be thought of as spanning the range of sale processes that are
actually used. In the comparison, BK assume that potential bidders only know the distri-
bution from which values are drawn prior to entering, and have no additional information
about their own value. After entry they nd out their values for sure. These assumptions
are common in the auction literature as they provide greater analytic tractability. Under
this informational assumption, together with the assumption that bidders are symmetric and
the seller cannot set a reserve price, BK show that \sellers will generally prefer auctions and
buyers will generally prefer sequential mechanisms" (p: 1547).
This result holds in BK's model because, in the equilibrium they consider, early bidders
with high enough values submit bids that deter all future potential entry (all future potential
entrants have the same beliefs about their values prior to entry), and there is too much
deterrence from the seller's perspective. Thus, he would prefer the greater actual competition
provided by the auction. In particular, deterrence means that later potential entrants with
high values will not enter, which decreases both the expected value of the winning bidder and
the value that an incumbent has to pay. In contrast, buyers prefer the sequential mechanism
as expenditures on entry costs are lower. This eect also tends to increase social eciency.
In light of their result, BK interpret the use of sequential mechanisms as evidence that
buyer's preferences can determine the choice of mechanism, consistent with the fact that some
inuential buyers, such as Warren Buett, have explicit policies that they will not \waste
time" by participating in auctions.
In this paper, we consider a similar comparison, except that we extend BK's model to
allow potential buyers to receive a noisy signal about their valuation prior to deciding whether
to enter either mechanism. After entry, they nd out their values for sure, as in BK's model.
This structure results in a \selective entry" model, where rms enter if they receive high
enough signals, and rms with higher values are more likely to enter.4;5 We believe that
this is a natural model to describe settings where rms are likely to have some imperfect
information about their value for an asset based on publicly available information, but must
conduct costly research to discover additional information that will aect their value.6 We
set of potential bidders in these contests is larger than the set submitting public bids.
4The precision of the signal determines how selective the entry process is. In its limits, the model can
approach the polar cases of (a) perfect selection, which we term the S model after Samuelson (1985), whereby
a rm knows its value exactly when taking its entry decision, and (b) no selection, which we term the LS
model after Levin and Smith (1994), whereby a rm knows nothing of its value when taking its entry decision.
5Selective entry contrasts with standard assumptions in the empirical entry literature (e.g., Berry (1992))
where entrants may dier from non-entering potential entrants in their xed costs or entry costs, but not
along dimensions such as marginal costs or product quality that aect competitiveness or the prots of other
rms once they enter.
6Examples include oil and gas leases, timber sales, government procurement contracts and rm takeovers.
Recently there has been some work allowing for selection in empirical auction research. The dominant way
this is done is by assuming that bidders know their value precisely prior to entry, i.e. by assuming perfect
3also allow for potential buyers to be asymmetric, which is another important feature of many
real-world settings.
Using numerical analysis, which becomes necessary once either asymmetries or selective
entry are added to the model, we show that the sequential mechanism can give the seller higher
expected revenues than the simultaneous auction even when buyers' signals about their values
are quite noisy. When the entry process is quite selective and/or entry costs are large, the
dierence in revenues can be substantial, and, as a comparison, the increase in revenues from
using the sequential mechanism is much larger than the returns to using an optimal reserve
price in the simultaneous auction. As in BK's analysis, the sequential mechanism is more
ecient, and the sequential mechanism generally gives higher expected payos to both buyers
and sellers. This result would obviously lead to a dierent interpretation of why sequential
mechanisms are sometimes used, and because the sequential mechanism increases the payos
of buyers, it is still consistent with comments like those of Warren Buett. Our ndings
are also consistent with observed dierences in target shareholder returns in private equity
transactions documented by Subramanian (2008). He compares returns when companies are
sold using a go-shop process and a process where many rms are simultaneously asked to
submit bids before a winner is selected. He nds that target shareholder returns are 5% higher
for go-shops and he argues that, even though go-shop agreements introduce asymmetries
between bidders into the sale process, they are preferable for both buyers and sellers.
We illustrate our ndings using parameters estimated from a sample of (simultaneous)
open outcry US Forest Service (USFS) timber auctions. This setting provides a close match
to the information structure assumed in our model as a potential bidder can form a rough-
estimate of its value based on tract information published by the USFS and knowledge
of its own sales contracts and capabilities, and it is also standard for interested bidders to
conduct their own tract surveys (\cruises") prior to bidding. It is also a setting where various
auction design tools, such as reserve price policies, have been studied by both academics and
practitioners in order to try to raise revenues which have often been regarded as too low.7
selection. For example, Li and Zheng (2009) compare estimates from both the LS and S models using
data on highway lawn mowing contracts from Texas to understand how potential competition may aect
procurement costs, and Li and Zheng (2010) test the LS and S models using timber auctions in Michigan.
Marmer, Shneyerov, and Xu (2010) extend this literature by testing whether the Li and Zheng (2009) data
is best explained by the LS, S or a more general aliated signal model. They nd support for the S and
signal models, and they also estimate a very simple version of their signal model. Finally, Gentry and Li
(2010) show how partial identication techniques can be used to construct bounds on the primitives of a
signal model.
7Some examples of studies of timber auction reserve prices include Mead, Schniepp, and Watson (1981),
Paarsch (1997), Haile and Tamer (2003), Li and Perrigne (2003) and Aradillas-Lopez, Gandhi, and Quint
(2010). All of these papers assume that entry is not endogenous. Academics have also provided expert
advice to government agencies about how to set reserve prices (stumpage rates) for timber (e.g. Athey,
Cramton, and Ingraham (2003)). In 2006, Governor Tim Pawlenty of Minnesota commissioned a task force
4Timber auctions are also characterized by important asymmetries between potential buyers,
with sawmills tending to have systematically higher values than loggers.
Our estimates imply that the entry process into timber auctions is moderately selective,
while average entry costs are 2.3% of the average winning bid, which is large enough to
prevent many loggers from entering auctions. For the (mean) representative auction in our
data, our results imply that using a sequential mechanism (with no reserve) would generate
a nine times larger increase in revenues than setting the optimal reserve price (the focus of
the existing literature) in the simultaneous auction. We also nd that the eciency gains
from using the sequential mechanism are large enough that both the USFS revenues and rm
prots can increase. Additionally, loggers (the weaker type) win more often. These results
suggest that the sequential mechanism may present the USFS and other procurement agencies
with an eective, new alternative to commonly used set-aside programs and bid subsidies for
ensuring that a certain fraction of projects are won by a targeted set of bidders.8
Why does the sequential mechanism tend to produce higher revenues when entry is se-
lective? The key reason is that selective entry changes the nature of the equilibrium in the
sequential mechanism in a way that tends to increase both its relative eciency and the rev-
enues that the seller can extract. With no selection, BK show that the \pre-emptive bidding
[which occurs in equilibrium] is crucial: jump-bidding allows buyers to choose partial-pooling
deterrence equilibria which over-deter entry relative to the social optimum" (p: 1546). In-
troducing any degree of selection into the entry process causes the bidding equilibrium (in
the unique equilibrium under the D1 renement which we focus on) to change so that there
is full separation, with bids perfectly revealing the value of the incumbent.9 At the same
time, a potential entrant will enter if it receives a high enough signal about its value. These
changes increase the eciency of the outcome in the sequential mechanism as higher value
incumbents deter more entry with higher value potential entrants being more likely to en-
ter. Unlike in BK's model, the expected value of the winner can be higher in the sequential
mechanism, which increases the rents available to all parties. In addition, the change to a
separating equilibrium aects the equilibrium level of jump bids. For some values, this will
increase the expected amount that bidders pay, beneting the seller.
Some comments about the nature of our results are appropriate. First, we do not seek
to investigate the performance of the state's timber sale policies, and its report indicates an openness to
considering alternative sales mechanisms as well as dierent reserve prices (Kilgore, Brown, Coggins, and
Pfender (2010)).
8The USFS has historically used set-asides and recent work (Athey, Coey, and Levin (2011)) suggests this
may come at a substantial revenue and eciency loss relative to using bid subsidies.
9This is correct for values less than the upper limit of the value distribution minus the cost of entry. An
upper limit on the value distribution is required for technical reasons but we assume that it is suciently
high that, for practical purposes, all incumbent values are revealed.
5to compare revenues with those from the optimal mechanism. Instead, in the same spirit
as BK, we are interested in the relative performance of stylized versions of commonly used
sales mechanisms, whereas the seller optimal mechanism, which is not known for a model
with imperfectly selective entry (Milgrom (2004)), is likely to involve features, such as side
payments or entry fees that are rarely observed in practice, and which might require the
seller to have implausibly detailed information.10 The seller would also need to know this
information if he wants to set the optimal reserve price in an auction, and, indeed, an
attraction of the simple sequential mechanism that we consider is that the only required
information concerns the set of potential entrants who should be approached.11 We show
below that if the seller has enough information to set an optimal reserve in the sequential
mechanism, he can do even better.
On the other hand, what is known about the optimal mechanism in models with costly
entry and either no selection or perfect selection suggests that the optimal mechanism should
be sequential, which helps to rationalize our results. For example, Cremer, Spiegel, and Zheng
(2009) consider the case with no selection and McAfee and McMillan (1988) consider a model
where buyers know their values but it is costly for the seller to engage additional buyers. In
both cases, the optimal mechanism involves some type of sequential search procedure, which
stops when a buyer with a high enough value is identied.12
Second, while we characterize the unique equilibrium of each mechanism under standard
renements, our revenue comparisons are numerical in nature. This is a necessary cost of
allowing for either a more general model of entry, or bidder asymmetries. Our results show
that these features matter because the relative performance of the mechanisms can change
even when selection is quite imperfect. The computational approach also allows us to provide
a substantive empirical application of our model as selective entry and bidder asymmetries
are clear features of our data.
Third, the sequential mechanism can be characterized as a multi-round extension of a
standard two-player signaling game where an incumbent bidder can use a jump bid to signal
its value to later potential entrants. We contribute to the literature on extensions of two-
10Our approach is therefore similar to analyses of practical mechanisms in other settings, such as Chu,
Leslie, and Sorensen (2011) (bundling), Rogerson (2003) (contracts), McAfee (2002) (nonlinear pricing) and
Neeman (2003) (auctions).
11In this sense the sequential mechanism satises what has come to be known as the \Wilson doctrine"
(Wilson (1987)), which suggests that, from a practical standpoint, we ought to be concerned with mechanisms
that do not rely on the seller possessing unrealistically detailed information about buyers.
12In this environment, Ye (2007) considers two-stage bidding structures where the seller must choose how
many rms pay the entry cost ahead of the rst stage. His paper clearly shows how to determine the optimal
number of entrants. However, he does not consider a wider range of mechanisms that might allow, for
example, the seller to set a reserve price or to decide how many rms should enter only after the rst stage
bids are submitted.
6player signaling games by characterizing the unique sequential equilibrium under standard
renements and providing a straightforward recursive algorithm for calculating equilibrium
strategies. We also note that our ndings relate to the classic limit pricing result of Milgrom
and Roberts (1982). As they show in a two-period, two-rm setting, an incumbent's incentive
to deter a competitor's entry can benet consumers through lower prices. We nd a similar
result that the incentive to deter later potential competitors can benet a seller through
higher prices.
Fourth, we note two dierences, beside the introduction of selective entry and bidder
asymmetries, between our model and the model considered by BK. First, we assume that the
number N of potential entrants is xed and common knowledge to all players, whereas BK's
model allows for some probability (0  j  1) of a jth potential entrant if there are j   1
potential entrants. As these probabilities may equal 1 for j < N, and 0 for j  N for any N,
our model is a special case of theirs. Our choice reects the standard practice in the empirical
literature, which we want to follow when estimating our model.13 Second, when modeling the
auction mechanism, we focus on the model where potential buyers make simultaneous entry
decisions as well as simultaneous bid choices, whereas BK's primary focus is on a model
where rms make sequential entry decisions before bidding simultaneously. However, in
BK's model \no important result is aected if potential bidders make simultaneous, instead
of sequential, entry decisions into the auction" (p:1560). We also give some consideration
to a sequential entry, simultaneous bid model, and show that our qualitative results are
unchanged. Our choice to focus on simultaneous entry into the auction reects a desire to
reduce the computational burden and, more importantly, the fact that simultaneous entry is
the appropriate way to model entry into the auctions in our empirical sample (Athey, Levin,
and Seira (forthcoming) also apply a simultaneous entry model (with no selection) to USFS
timber auctions).14
The paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 introduces the models of each mechanism and
characterizes the equilibria that we examine. Section 3 compares expected revenue and
eciency from the two mechanisms for wide ranges of parameters, and provides intuition for
when the sequential mechanism outperforms the auction. Section 4 describes the empirical
setting of USFS timber auctions and explains how we estimate our model. Section 5 presents
13Examples of this assumption in the auction literature include Athey, Levin, and Seira (forthcoming) and
Li and Zheng (2009). Examples elsewhere in empirical work on entry games include Berry (1992), Seim
(2006) and Ciliberto and Tamer (2009).
14The computational burden in the sequential entry, simultaneous bid auction model arises from the fact
that later potential entrants' equilibrium entry thresholds are a function of the complete history of the game
and thresholds in earlier rounds, so that it is necessary to solve for all of the thresholds simultaneously. In
contrast, in the sequential mechanism, a potential entrant's equilibrium threshold only depends on the value
of the incumbent which (with any degree of selection) is completely revealed by its jump bid.
7the parameter estimates and counterfactual results showing that the USFS could improve its
revenues by implementing a sequential mechanism. Section 6 concludes.
2 Model
We now describe the model of rms' values and signals, before describing the mechanisms
that we are going to compare.
2.1 A General Entry Model with Selection
Suppose that a seller has one unit of a good to sell and gets a payo of zero if the good is
unsold. There is a set of potential buyers who may be one of  = 1;:::; types, with N
of type . In practice  = 2. Buyers have independent private values (IPV), which can
lie on [0;V ], distributed according to F V
 (V ). F V
 is continuous and dierentiable for all
types. In this paper we will assume that the density of V is proportional to the log-normal
distribution on [0;V ], and that V is high, so that the density of values at V is very small.15
Before participating in any mechanism, a potential buyer must pay an entry cost K. This
entry cost can be interpreted as a combination of research costs necessary to learn one's
value and participation/bidding costs. Once it pays K, a potential buyer learns its value.
We assume that a rm cannot participate without paying K. However, prior to deciding
whether to enter, a bidder receives a private information signal about its value. We focus
on the case where the signal of potential buyer i of type  is given by si = viai, where
A = e";"  N(0;2
") and draws of " are assumed to be i.i.d. across bidders.
Let F S
 (s) be the unconditional distribution of a bidder's signal and F S
 (sjv) be the dis-
tribution conditional on a particular value v. In this model, 2
" controls how much potential
buyers know about their values before deciding whether to enter. As 2
" ! 1, the model
will tend towards the informational assumptions of the Levin and Smith (1994) (LS) model
in which pre-entry signals contain no information about values. As 2
" ! 0, it tends towards
the informational assumptions of the Samuelson (1985) (S) model where rms know their
values prior to paying an entry cost (which is therefore interpreted as a bid preparation or
attendance cost). Intermediate values of 2
", implying that buyers have some idea of their
values but have to conduct costly research to learn them for sure, seem plausible for most
empirical settings. Having received his signal, a potential buyer forms posterior beliefs about
his valuation using Bayes Rule.
15To be precise, fV (vj) =
h(vj)
R V
0 h(xj)dx, where h(vj) is the pdf of the log-normal distribution.
82.2 Mechanism 1: Simultaneous Entry Second Price Auction
The rst mechanism we consider is a simultaneous entry second price or open outcry auction
that we model as a two-stage game. In the rst stage all potential buyers simultaneously
decide whether to enter the auction (pay K) based on their signal, the number of potential
entrants of each type and the auction reserve price. In the second stage, entrants then learn
their values and submit bids. We assume that an open outcry auction would give the same
outcome as an English button auction, so that the good would be awarded to the rm with
the highest value at a price equal to the value of the second highest valued entrant or the
reserve price if one is used.16
Following the literature (e.g. Athey, Levin, and Seira (forthcoming)), we assume that
players use strategies that form type-symmetric Bayesian Nash equilibria, where \type-
symmetric" means that every player of the same type will use the same strategy. In the
auction's second stage, entrants know their values so it is a dominant strategy for each en-
trant to bid its value. In the rst stage, players take entry decisions based on what they
believe about their value given their signal. The (posterior) conditional density g(vjsi) that
a player of type 's value is v when its signal is si is dened via Bayes Rule.
The weights that a player places on its prior and its signal when updating its beliefs about
its true value depend on the relative variances of the distribution of values and " (signal noise),






", which we will denote . If the value distribution were not truncated above, player
i's (posterior) conditional value distribution would be lognormal with location parameter
 + (1   )ln(si) and squared scale parameter 2
V .
The optimal entry strategy in a type-symmetric equilibrium is a pure-strategy threshold
rule where the rm enters if and only if its signal is above a cuto, S0
 . S0
 is implicitly
dened by the zero-prot condition that the expected prot from entering the auction of a













 )dv   K = 0 (1)
where g(vjs) is dened above, and h(xjS0
 ;S0
 ) is the pdf of the highest value of other
entering rms (or the reserve price R if no value is higher than the reserve) in the auction,
given equilibrium strategies. A pure strategy type-symmetric Bayesian Nash equilibrium
exists because optimal entry thresholds for each type are continuous and decreasing in the
threshold of the other type.
16Our estimation procedure does not require that other losing bidders bid up to their values.
9With multiple types, there can be multiple equilibria in the entry game when types are
similar (for example, in the means of their values) even when we assume that only type-
symmetric equilibria are played. As explained in Roberts and Sweeting (2011), we choose to
focus on an equilibrium where the type with higher mean values has a lower entry threshold
(lower thresholds make entry more likely). This type of equilibrium is intuitively appealing
and when rms' reaction functions are S-shaped (reecting, for example, normal or log-normal
value and signal noise distributions) and types only dier in the location parameters of their
value distributions (i.e., the scale parameter, signal noise variance and entry costs are the
same) then there is exactly one equilibrium of this form.17 Therefore, we assume that types
only dier in the location parameters of their value distributions from now on. Given our
focus on this type of equilibrium, solving the model is straightforward: we nd the S0 values
that satisfy the zero prot conditions for each type and which satisfy the constraint that
S0
1 < S0
2 , where a type 1 rm is the high type (larger location parameter). It is important
to note that the issue of type-symmetric multiple equilibria aects only the auction, not the
sequential mechanism.
2.3 Mechanism 2: Sequential Mechanism
As BK and others note, the standard alternative to buyers submitting bids simultaneously
is a sequential bid process. Here we describe a very simple sequential bid process like that
in BK. Potential buyers are placed in some order (which does not depend on their signals,
but may depend on types), and the seller approaches each potential buyer in turn. We will
call what happens between the seller's approach to one potential buyer and its approach to
the next potential buyer a \round". In the rst round, the rst potential buyer observes his
signal and then decides whether to enter the mechanism and learn his value by paying K. If
he enters he can choose to place a `jump bid' above the reserve price, which we assume to be
zero. Given entry, submitting a bid is costless.
In the second round the potential buyer observes his signal, the entry decision of the rst
buyer and his jump bid, and then decides whether to enter himself. If the rst rm did not
enter and the second rm does, then the second rm can place a bid in exactly the same
way as the rst rm would have been able to do had he entered. If both enter, the rms bid
against each other in a knockout button auction until one rm drops out, in which case it
can never return to the mechanism. The remaining rm then has an opportunity to submit
17We have also estimated the model using a nested pseudo-likelihood procedure which does not require
us to use an equilibrium selection rule. The parameter estimates in this case indicate that the dierence in
mean values between our two types (sawmills and logging companies) are so large that multiple equilibria
cannot be supported.
10an additional higher jump bid above the bid at which the other rm dropped out. If the
second rm does not enter, but the rst rm did, then the rst rm can either keep its initial
bid or submit a higher jump bid.
This procedure is then repeated for each remaining potential buyer, so that in each round
there is at most one incumbent bidder and one potential entrant. The complete history of
the game (entry decisions and bids, but not signals) is observed by all players. If a rm drops
out, or chooses not enter, it is assumed to be unable to re-enter at a later date. The good is
allocated to the last remaining bidder at a price equal to the current bid.
A strategy in the sequential model consists of an entry rule and a bidding rule as a function
of the round, the potential buyer's signal and value (for bidding) and the observed history.
When a potential buyer is bidding against an active opponent in the knockout auction, the
dominant strategy is to bid up to its value, so that the rm with the lower value will drop
out at a price equal to its value. This does not depend on the selective entry model because
values are known at this stage. However, the strategies that rms use to determine their
jump bids and entry decisions do depend on selective entry. To place our equilibrium in
context, we begin describing what happens when there are no signals and symmetric rms,
which are the assumptions made by BK.
Before describing this mechanism's equilibrium, we note that it is straightforward for a
seller to implement this mechanism. In particular, the seller needs only to identify potential
entrants, specify and commit to a buyer order and establish a program for collecting and
distributing information on the entry and bidding behavior of all rms. For sellers that will
implement the mechanism many times, such as the USFS, any xed costs involved in setting
up the mechanism should be relatively small.
2.3.1 Equilibrium with No Pre-Entry Signals
Assuming symmetric rms and no pre-entry signals, BK show that any entering rm that
learns its value is below some endogenously determined V S will keep the existing standing
bid, while rms with values above V S will submit a jump bid that deters all future entry,
no matter how many rounds are left. This is because all future potential entrants have
identical information about their values prior to taking entry decisions. V S is independent of
the round of the game and history to that point and it is determined by the condition that
future potential entrants should be indierent to entering when the incumbent rm's value
is above V S. The deterring bid is determined by the condition that the bidder with a value
V S is indierent between deterring future entry with this deterring bid and accommodating
entry by keeping the standing bid. Thus while in any round all rms with values above V S
submit the same deterring bid, this bid may depend on the round and history of the game.
11Equilibrium with no signals is therefore characterized by entry in every round until a rm
with a value greater than V S participates, in which case entry ceases forever. BK show that
while this leads to higher expected eciency than the auction, from the seller's standpoint,
too many bidders are deterred from participating and in equilibrium revenues tend to be
lower than in the auction.
2.3.2 Equilibrium with Pre-Entry Signals
There are important changes to the nature of the equilibrium when potential buyers receive
pre-entry signals. We begin by describing the equilibrium we consider, before explaining the
renements that lead us to focus on it.
A potential entrant in any round n participates if and only if his signal exceeds some
threshold S0
n(v), at which the expected prots from entering are zero and is a function of the
round, his beliefs about the current incumbent's (if there is one) value (v) and the expected
behavior of future potential entrants. Upon entry, an incumbent and a new entrant bid up to
their values in the knockout auction. The winner of the knockout auction may then submit
a jump bid that may deter future entry. For a bidder with values on [0;V  K], its jump bid
will perfectly reveal its value and so we assume that a new incumbent jump bids the rst time
he is able and after placing one jump bid he will not do so again. Therefore, given a bidding
function in round n, (v;b bn;n), which depends on the bidder's value (v), the standing bid
prior to the jump bid being placed (b bn - this will be zero when the bidder is the rst entrant
and otherwise it will be the previous incumbent's value since they will have just lost in a
knockout auction prior to a new jump bid being placed) and the round, an incumbent with
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1   F S(S0
k(v0)jx)

dx is the probability that entry occurs
and that the maximum value of all future entrants, when the incumbent's value at the end
of round n is believed to be v0, is less than t, and fn;v0(t) =
@Fn;v0(t)
@v .18 The rst part of
equation 2 reects the incumbent's prots when either there is no more entry or, all future
entrants have values less than the jump bid, so the incumbent can win at his jump bid. The
second part reects the incumbent's prot if an entrant has a value above the jump bid.
Dierentiating equation 2 with respect to v0, and requiring that the rst order condition
equals zero when v = v0 (so that local incentive compatibility constraints are satised), gives
18Note that Fn;v0(V ) = 1   Pr[no entry in future], so that we are not double counting in equation 2.




















k(v)) + F n;v(())
(3)
The lower boundary condition is provided by the condition that incumbents with values less
than or equal to the standing bid will submit the standing bid. For values on [V   K;V ]
bidders pool and submit (V   K;b bn;n).
When an incumbent bids b  (V  K;b bn;n), the posterior belief of any potential entrant
in round m > n about the incumbent's value will place all of the weight on  1(b;b bn;n).
Thus, this potential entrant's entry threshold S0
m( 1(b;b b;n)) is implicitly dened by the










Upon observing a bid at (V   K;b bn;n), beliefs will be consistent with Bayes Rule and a
potential entrant will not participate.
Given the nature of this equilibrium we can solve the game recursively. For the nal
potential entrant, who believes that he will win if his value is greater than the incumbent's
(in which case the nal price will be the incumbent's value), we can solve for the equilibrium
entry thresholds on a grid of possible values for an incumbent rm. Next we consider the
previous potential entrant, and, given these nal round thresholds, we can solve for both this
entrant's entry thresholds and its equilibrium bid functions for a grid of possible values for
an incumbent using equations 3 and 4. We then repeat the procedure for the third-from-last
potential entrant, and so on until we reach the rst round, where there will be no incumbent.
2.3.3 Equilibrium and Renement
We now explain why the equilibrium just described exists and is the only equilibrium con-
sistent with the D1 renement (Banks and Sobel (1987), Cho and Kreps (1987)), which is a
commonly used renement for signaling models (Fudenberg and Tirole (1991)). For clarity
we rst consider the case with two potential entrants, which matches existing models in the
signaling literature closely. We then consider the extension to the case with more rms. As
the distribution of values has the same support for all types, adding more types has no eect
on our arguments, so we assume there is only one type to reduce notation.
Our arguments will make use of three properties of the game. Let v(b1;S0
2) be the
13expected prot of a rst round incumbent with value v where b1 is his bid and S0
2 is the entry
threshold chosen by the second round potential entrant. Given our assumptions and the
dominant strategies in the knockout game, v(b1;S0
2) will be continuous and dierentiable in













2 is monotonic in v;
3. S0
2 is uniquely dened for any belief about the rst potential entrant's value, and the
potential entrant's response is more favorable to the incumbent when the potential
entrant thinks that the incumbent's value is higher.
The appendix shows that these properties hold in our model.
The results in Mailath (1987) imply that there is an unique separating equilibrium on
the [0;V   K] interval which can be found using the dierential equation given by equation
3 and the boundary condition in a continuous type signaling model when the single crossing
condition (property 2 above) holds. His results do not rule out the possibility of pooling
equilibria on this interval. However, Ramey (1996) (who extends the results in Cho and
Sobel (1990) to the case of an unbounded action space and a continuum of types on an
interval) shows that these three properties imply that only a separating equilibrium will
satisfy the D1 renement, so our equilibrium must be the only one satisfying D1. As noted
by Mailath (1987); this equilibrium will also be the separating equilibrium which is least
costly to the rst round potential entrant.19
The conditions also imply that, if an incumbent with value V   K prefers (V   K),
which will stop all future entry, to a lower bid then all incumbents with values above V  K
will prefer (V   K) to lower bids. But, rms with values above V   K will also strictly
prefer to bid (V  K) than any higher bid (for any beliefs of the potential entrant following
a higher bid), because by bidding (V   K) the incumbent can get the asset for sure at a
lower price. Therefore, in equilibrium all entrants with values greater than V   K pool.
Three (or More) Rounds We now consider a model with three potential entrants (ar-
guments for more rounds would follow directly from this case). We make the natural sim-
plication by restricting ourselves to equilibria where all potential entrants make the same
inferences from a bid by an incumbent and incumbents only make jump bids in the rst round
19Given that we show below that the sequential mechanism tends to generate higher revenues than the
auction, the fact that we focus on the least cost separating equilibrium implies that our results may be
conservative since other equilibria in the sequential mechanism would give even higher revenues to the seller.
14that they enter.20 The two period equilibrium discussed above would dene strategies for
the nal two rounds if the second period entrant enters and defeats any incumbent entrant
from the rst round (with an adjusted boundary condition to reect the new standing bid).
It therefore only remains to be shown that there is a unique sequential equilibrium bid func-
tion, which is fully separating for values [0;V   K], for a rst round entrant. A rst round
entrant's jump bid sends a signal to the second round potential entrant, and, if he is still
an incumbent in the nal round, which must be the case if he is to win, the nal potential
entrant. Conditional on the incumbent surviving the second round, the third round is just a
repeat of another two round game. The rst round entrant's expected prot function is now
v(b1;S0
2;S0






























3 are both monotonic in v;
3. both S0
2 and S0
3 are uniquely dened for any belief about the rst entrant's value, and
both potential entrants' responses are more favorable to the rst entrant when they
think that its value is higher.
These conditions allow us to apply the D1 renement to the signaling game between
the incumbent making the jump bid and every subsequent potential entrant to identify the
unique separating equilibrium.
2.3.4 Illustrative Example of the Sequential Mechanism's Equilibrium
To provide additional clarity about how the mechanism works, given equilibrium strategies,
Table 1 presents what happens in a game with four potential entrants and one type of rm
with values distributed proportional to LN(4:5;0:2) on [0,200], K = 1 and " = 0:2 ( = 0:5).
In the example, the rst potential entrant enters if he receives a signal greater than 75.0,
which is the case here. The signal thresholds in later rounds depend on the number of rounds
remaining and the incumbent's value. So, when the incumbent is the same as in the previous
round, the threshold S0 falls since the expected prots of an entrant who beats the incumbent
rise (because he will face less competition in the future). On the other hand, S0 does not
depend on the level of the standing bid given the incumbent's value, because it has no eect
on the entrant's prots if he beats the incumbent in a knockout (since the standing bid must
20It is possible that future potential entrants could ignore the information that they have on games before
the last round. In this case, incumbents would choose to submit jump bids every round to signal information
to the next potential entrant. This simplication allows us to consider a model where a rm sends at most
one signal to many possible receivers.
15Initial Potential Entrant Post-Knockout Post-Jump Bid
Round Standing Bid Value Signal S0 Entry Standing Bid Standing Bid
1 - 80.0 90.1 75.0 Yes - 69.3
2 69.3 75.4 50.5 69.4 No 69.3 69.3
3 69.3 116.0 114.9 61.7 Yes 80.0 87.1
4 87.1 100.0 114.0 107.0 Yes 100.0 100.0
Seller's Revenue = 100.0, social surplus (winner's value less total entry costs) =113.0
Table 1: A simple example of how the sequential mechanism works in a game with four
potential entrants and one type of rm with values distributed proportional to LN(4:5;0:2)
on [0,200], K = 1 and " = 0:2.
be below the incumbent's value). In round 2, the incumbent does not face entry, so there
is no change in the standing bid because incumbents do not place additional jump bids.21
In round 3, the standing bid rises during the knockout, and the new incumbent places an
additional jump bid. In round 4 the last potential entrant participates, but his value is less
than the incumbent's and so revenue is the price at which this last entrant drops out.
We can also use this example to give intuition for how introducing selection aects bid
functions and entry probabilities. With selection, the level of bids is determined by the fact
that bids must be suciently high that rms with lower values will not want to copy them.
In particular, if the entry decisions of later potential entrants are likely to be more sensitive
to beliefs about the incumbent's value, then the equilibrium bid function must increase more
quickly in v. A straightforward way to illustrate this is to focus on the last two rounds of the
sequential mechanism when a new incumbent in the penultimate round only needs to worry
about one more potential entrant, and the nal round potential entrant would face no further
entry if he enters and outbids the incumbent. This is illustrated in Figure 1, which compares
the equilibrium bid functions in the penultimate round, and equilibrium probabilities of entry
in the nal round of the sequential mechanism for varying degrees of selection.
Specically, the left panel displays bid functions for a new incumbent in the penultimate
round, when the previous incumbent's value was 80. The right panel gives the probability
that the nal round potential entrant participates as a function of this new incumbent's
value. Successively lower degrees of selection change the bid function so that when  ! 1 it
approaches the bid function in the LS (no selection) model (the bold line), which is a step
function with a jump at a value of 119 (the level of the incumbent's value that deters all
future entry). The slope of the bid function is more gradual for lower s since the probability
that the nal round potential entrant participates declines more smoothly when  is lower.
21There would also have been no change in the standing bid if the entrant had come in, because the
entrant's value was below the current bid, so the standing bid would not have risen in the knockout.













































































Figure 1: Penultimate round bid function for a new incumbent and probability of entry for
the nal round potential entrant, with symmetric rms, values LN(4.5,0.2) on [0,200], K=1
and standing bid of 80.
3 Comparison of Expected Revenues and Eciency
Before introducing specic parameters estimated from data for USFS timber auctions, we
present a more general comparison of expected revenues and eciency between the sequential
mechanism and the simultaneous entry auction. We see this general comparison as valuable,
because it shows that our results in the empirical application are not going to be particularly
sensitive to the parameters that we estimate, and they provide guidance about when auctions
should perform well in other settings. Additionally, we allow a reserve price to be used in
the simultaneous auction but restrict attention, for now, to a sequential mechanism with no
reserve. In this way the results are biased against a seller preferring the sequential mechanism.
We focus on how the performance of the mechanisms depends on the level of entry costs






V , where a higher value of  indicates that signals are less precise. As a base case,
we consider 8 symmetric rms whose values are distributed LN(4:5;0:2) so that the value
distribution has a mean of 91.6 and a standard deviation of 18.6.
Figure 2 shows the results of comparing expected revenues from the sequential mechanism
17(with no reserve) and a simultaneous entry auction with an optimal reserve in (K;) space.22
Filled squares represent outcomes where the expected revenues from the sequential mecha-
nism are higher by more than 4% (of auction revenues), while hollow squares are outcomes
where they are higher but only by between 0.1% and 4%. Diamonds represent cases where
the simultaneous auction gives higher revenues. Crosses on the grid mark locations where
the dierence in revenues is less than 0.1%. Due to small numerical errors in solving dieren-
tial equations and simulation error in calculating expected revenue, we take the conservative
approach of not signing revenue dierences in these cases.




























Square = Sequential Dominates, Diamond = Auction Dominates
Filled = 4.00%+ , Hollow = 0.10% − 4.00%
K
α
Figure 2: Expected revenue comparison for 8 symmetric rms, values LN(4.5,0.2), optimal
reserve price in auction, no reserve price in sequential mechanism.
The results indicate that the sequential mechanism generally produces higher expected
revenues than the auction, even when no reserve price is used in the sequential mechanism,
whereas the optimal reserve price is used in the auction. The exception is for very low values
of K and high , but the revenue advantage of the auction is always small (the maximum
dierence is 1.1%). These points are consistent with BK's theoretical results as their model
assumes no signals and requires that at least two rms will enter the auction, which implies
that K must be low.
22Sequential (auction) mechanism's expected revenues are calculated using 200,000 (5,000,000) simulations.
18Economists and mechanism designers may be concerned with eciency as well as revenues,
and the sequential mechanism outperforms the auction along both dimensions. With no
selection, low entry costs and symmetric bidders, BK show that the sequential mechanism is
always more ecient, where eciency is measured by the expected value of the winner less
total entry costs paid. Increasing selection reduces the overall amount of entry and further
wasteful entry costs, which serves to raise eciency. It can also be the case that the expected
value of winner in the sequential mechanism is higher than that in the auction, despite the
lower number of entrants. For example, taking the parameters from Figure 2, when K = 1,
the expected value of the winner is greater in the sequential mechanism for   0:25. For
higher K the expected value of the winner is always greater in the sequential mechanism. This
is contrary to results from a no selection model, where \the expected value of the top bidder
in the auction must be higher than in the sequential mechanism" (BK p. 1546). However,
even when the expected value of the winner in the auction exceeds that in the sequential
mechanism, the elimination of wasteful entry costs tends to suciently compensate so as to
raise eciency in the sequential mechanism. For example, over the grid given in Figure 2,
there is no case in which the auction is more ecient than the sequential mechanism.
Regarding asymmetries, in a simultaneous entry auction weaker bidders need to consider
the odds of competing against stronger bidders. While this is still true in the sequential
mechanism, if the weaker bidders are approached last, given the separating equilibrium they
know the values of the higher types that have entered. This permits more ecient entry
of the weaker bidders and achieves a more ecient allocation of the good relative to the
auction. For example suppose that K = 5 and  = 0:4, N = 4 and the rst two bidders
approached have values proportional to LN(4:5;0:2), while the last two bidders approached
have values proportional to LN(4:4;0:2).23 The probability that each of the weaker rms
enters the simultaneous auction is 0.20 and the probability that one of them wins is only
0.17. On the other hand, in the sequential mechanism the entry probabilities are 0.143 for
the rst one and 0.139 for the second and the probability that one of them wins is 0.28. This
is much closer to the probability that one of the weaker rms will have the highest value
(0.33). In this case, the sequential mechanism's expected revenues of 83.34 exceed those of
the auction, which are 78.40.
When bidders are asymmetric, sellers may prefer a rst price auction with type-specic
reserve prices to a second price auction with a uniform reserve. However, continuing with this
example, even a rst price auction with type-specic optimal reserve prices only generates
expected revenues of 80.41, and so it is outperformed by the sequential mechanism with no
23Our simulations show that approaching all of the high value rms rst, followed by all of the low values
rms is better than doing the opposite.
19reserve price.
The separating equilibrium also has the eect of improving sellers' abilities to appropriate
the larger rents in the sequential mechanism. This is important to note since, in BK's partial
pooling equilibrium, high value participants' ability to completely forestall entry permits
them to capture enough of the sequential mechanism's greater overall rents that sellers expect
lower revenues than in the auction. Revenues in the auction are obviously determined by the
second highest value of the bidders. In the sequential mechanism, revenues are determined
by the maximum of the second highest value of participants and the deterring bid of the
eventual winner. Thus, the larger rents can be appropriated either through stronger actual
competition (the value of the second highest bidder is greater in the sequential mechanism) or
by forcing the eventual winner to bid more aggressively to deter future potential competitors
from participating. There are forces working towards and against encouraging stronger actual
competition in the sequential mechanism. On the one hand, it can do better at selecting high
value potential entrants into the mechanism. This is evidenced by the expected value of the
winner in the sequential process sometimes exceeding that in the auction despite reduced
entry. On the other hand, fewer bidders tend to participate, which lowers the expected
value of the second highest value bidder. However, the threat of future potential entry by
strong bidders forces the eventual winner to bid more aggressively and this tends to raise the
seller's revenues. For example, the expected value of the second highest entrant is greater
in the auction than in the sequential mechanism for each grid point in Figure 2. However,
the winner's deterring bid is high enough to earn the seller higher revenues for almost all
cases. In this sense, we nd that the threat of future potential competition in the sequential
mechanism leads to higher prices than does the greater actual competition in a simultaneous
bid auction.
By way of example, Figure 1 illustrates how selection's eect on bid functions and equilib-
rium probabilities of entry serve to increase revenues in the sequential mechanism. Compared
to the LS model, the bid functions with selection are higher for values less than 119, which
is where this incumbent's value distribution is most dense. For example, when  = 0:1,
the mean and 90th percentile of a new incumbent who would nd himself in the position
of submitting a jump bid in the penultimate round are 101 and 121, respectively. While
for a portion of the value distribution the bid functions are lower than when  = 1, they
again (slightly) exceed this bid function for very high values. This is because there is always
a chance that the nal potential entrant receives an optimistic signal and enters (unless it
is inferred that the new incumbent's value is greater than V   K, here 199), which cannot
happen when the incumbent has a high value in BK's model. This is clearly illustrated in the
right panel, which gives the probability that the nal round potential entrant participates as
20a function of the new incumbent's value. This probability of entry is also a step function in
the LS model. Once there is some selection, there is always a chance that the nal round
potential entrant participates, even if the incumbent is thought to have a high value (again,
assuming its value is less than 199).
3.1 Sequential Mechanism with Reserve Prices
The numerical examples above indicate that a simple, stylized version of real-world sequential
mechanisms tends to outperform the commonly used auction, even when the optimal reserve
price is set in the auction. The sequential mechanism's advantage over the auction could be
increased through additional design elements, an obvious option being a reserve price. Figure
3 computes expected revenues when an optimal reserve price is added to each mechanism
when there are ve or eight symmetric bidders using the same value distribution parameters
as before and assuming K = 5. For the sequential mechanism, only one reserve price is used,
which is constant across all rounds in the mechanism. Generally, the seller could do better
with a round-specic reserve price, but we view a constant reserve price as approximately
imposing the same informational demands on the seller as does setting the optimal reserve
price in the simultaneous auction.
Figure 3 shows that adding a constant reserve price to the sequential mechanism may
substantially improve revenues. The reserve price aects sequential mechanism revenues in
two ways. First, in the event that no rm has entered through the rst N   1 rounds, a
reserve price guards the seller against giving the good away for free to the last potential
entrant. Second, a reserve price raises the rst entrant's deterring bid function.
The eect of a reserve price varies across mechanisms and for dierent values of N and .
There are two main reasons for this. First, when entry is endogenous, a reserve price has a
smaller impact when the level of entry is greater, as is generally the case (i) in the auction or
(ii) when N is greater, as is clearly shown in Figure 3. Second, a reserve price excludes some
bidders and if these were valuable to the seller, this reduces the value of a reserve price. This
eect can be seen by noticing that the impact of a reserve price in the sequential mechanism
falls for higher values of : less selection implies that marginal and inframarginal entrants
are more similar, which makes excluded bidders more valuable to the seller (it is also true
that the level of entry increases in , which also limits a reserve price's impact).


























SPA, N=5, No Reserve
SPA, N=5, Optimal Reserve
SPA, N=8, No Reserve
SPA, N=8, Optimal Reserve
Sequential, N=5, No Reserve
Sequential, N=5, Optimal Reserve
Sequential, N=8, No Reserve
Sequential, N=8, Optimal Reserve
Figure 3: Expected revenue comparison for varying N, with and without reserves. Firms are
symmetric with values distributed LN(4.5,0.2) and K = 5.
4 Empirical Application
We now turn to our empirical application that focuses on USFS timber auctions, which
we view as a sensible environment for evaluating the eects of switching to a sequential
mechanism. First, we nd that these auctions are characterized by a costly and moderately
selective entry process, features that we view as holding more generally across a wide variety
of auction environments. Second, unlike other environments, such as the M&A market, we
are able to observe the sale of many similar objects which facilitates estimation of bidder
values. Third, while a great deal of work has concentrated on auction design tools, such
as reserve prices, as means to increasing revenues in timber auctions, we show that a shift
to a sequential sales process has a much larger impact. We are brief in our discussions of
some reduced form evidence of selection and estimation method since Roberts and Sweeting
(2011) provide a more detailed discussion of these topics. Additionally, Gentry and Li (2010)
explore conditions under which an imperfectly selective entry model is non-parametrically
identied for rst price auctions.
224.1 Data
We analyze federal auctions of timberland in California. In these auctions the USFS sells
logging contracts to individual bidders who may or may not have manufacturing capabilities
(mills and loggers, respectively). When the sale is announced, the USFS provides its own
\cruise" estimate of the volume and value of timber for each species on the tract as well as
estimated costs of removing and processing the timber. It also announces a reserve price and
bidders must indicate a willingness to pay at least this amount to qualify for the auction.
After the sale is announced, interested potential bidders perform their own private cruises
in order to assess the tract's value. These cruises are informative about the tract's volume,
species make-up and timber quality.
We assume that bidders have independent private values. This assumption is also made
in other work with similar timber auction data (see for example Baldwin, Marshall, and
Richard (1997), Haile (2001) or Athey, Levin, and Seira (forthcoming)). A bidder's private
value is primarily related to its own contracts to sell the harvest, inventories and private
costs of harvesting. In addition, we focus on the period 1982-1989 when resale, which can
introduce a common value element, was limited (see Haile (2001) for an analysis of timber
auctions with resale).
We also assume non-collusive bidder behavior. While there has been some evidence of
bidder collusion in open outcry timber auctions, Athey, Levin, and Seira (forthcoming) nd
strong evidence of competitive bidding in these California auctions.
Our model assumes that bidders receive an imperfect signal of their value and they must
pay a participation cost to enter the auction.24 We interpret the USFS's publicly available
tract appraisal and a rm's own knowledge of its sales contracts and capabilities as generating
its pre-entry signal. Participation in these auctions is costly for numerous reasons. In addition
to the cost of attending the auction, a large fraction of a bidder's entry cost is its private
cruise. People in the industry tell us that rms do not bid without doing their own cruise,
which can provide information that bidders nd useful, such as trunk diameters, but is not
provided in USFS appraisals.
We use data on 887 ascending auctions.25 Table 2 shows summary statistics for our
sample. Bids are given in $ per thousand board feet (mbf) in 1983 dollars. The average mill
bid is 20.3% higher than the average logger bid. As suggested in Athey, Levin, and Seira
(forthcoming), mills may be willing to bid more than loggers due to cost dierences or the
imperfect competition loggers face when selling felled timber to mills.
24We note that we are not the rst to model a costly entry decision into these auctions (e.g. Athey, Levin,
and Seira (forthcoming)).
25Roberts and Sweeting (2011) include a detailed description of the sample selection process.
23Variable Mean Std. Dev. 25th-tile 50th-tile 75th-tile N
WINNING BID ($/mbf) 86.01 62.12 38.74 69.36 119.11 847
BID ($/mbf) 74.96 57.68 30.46 58.46 105.01 3426
LOGGER 65.16 52.65 26.49 49.93 90.93 876
MILL 78.36 58.94 32.84 61.67 110.91 2550
LOGGER WINS 0.15 0.36 0 0 0 887
FAIL 0.05 0.21 0 0 0 887
ENTRANTS 3.86 2.35 2 4 5 887
LOGGERS 0.99 1.17 0 1 1 887
MILLS 2.87 1.85 1 3 4 887
POTENTIAL ENTRANTS 8.93 5.13 5 8 13 887
LOGGER 4.60 3.72 2 4 7 887
MILL 4.34 2.57 2 4 6 887
SPECIES HHI 0.54 0.22 0.35 0.50 0.71 887
DENSITY (hundred mbf/acre) 0.21 0.21 0.07 0.15 0.27 887
VOLUME (hundred mbf) 76.26 43.97 43.60 70.01 103.40 887
RESERVE ($/mbf) 37.47 29.51 16.81 27.77 48.98 887
SELL VALUE ($/mbf) 295.52 47.86 260.67 292.87 325.40 887
LOG COSTS ($/mbf) 118.57 29.19 99.57 113.84 133.77 887
MFCT COSTS ($/mbf) 136.88 14.02 127.33 136.14 145.73 887
Table 2: Summary statistics for sample of California ascending auctions from 1982-1989. All
monetary gures in 1983 dollars. SPECIES HHI is the Herndahl index for wood species
concentration. SELL VALUE, LOG COSTS and MFCT COSTS are USFS estimates of the
value of the tract and the logging and manufacturing costs of the tract, respectively.
We dene potential entrants as the auction's bidders plus those rms who bid within 50
km of an auction over the next month. One way of assessing the appropriateness of this
denition is that 98% of the bidders in any auction also bid in another auction within 50
km of this auction over the next month and so we are unlikely to be missing many actual
potential entrants. The median number of potential bidders is eight (mean of 8.93) and this
is evenly divided between mills and loggers.
In Table 2, entrants are dened as the set of bidders we observe at the auction, even
if they did not submit a bid above the reserve price.26 The median number of mill and
logger entrants are three and one, respectively. Among the set of potential logger entrants,
on average 21.5% enter, whereas on average 66.1% of potential mill entrants enter. The
dierences in bids and entry decisions are consistent with mills having signicantly higher
values than loggers.27
26However, in our preferred empirical specication below, we interpret the data more cautiously and allow
bidders that do not submit bids to have entered (paid K), but learned that their value was less than the
reserve price.
27Roberts and Sweeting (2011) present evidence that dierences in values, and not entry costs, explain
244.2 Evidence of Selection
Roberts and Sweeting (2011) present reduced form evidence that the data are best explained
by a model allows for selection. There are two main pieces of evidence. First, Athey, Levin,
and Seira (forthcoming) show that in the type-symmetric mixed strategy equilibrium of a
model with endogenous, but non-selective, entry and asymmetric bidder types, whenever the
weaker type enters with positive probability, the stronger type enters with probability one.
Thus, for any auction with some logger entry, a model with no selection would imply that all
potential mill entrants enter. In 54.5% of auctions in which loggers participate, and there are
some potential mill entrants, some, but not all, mills participate. Likewise, they show that
whenever the stronger type enters with probability less than one, a model with no selection
implies that weaker types enter with probability zero. However, in the data we nd that in
61.1% of auctions in which only some mill potential entrants participate and potential logger
entrants exist, some loggers enter. A model with selective entry can rationalize partial entry
of both bidder types into the same auction.
Second, a model without selection implies that bidders are a random sample of potential
entrants. Roberts and Sweeting (2011) test this by estimating a Heckman selection model
with the exclusion restriction that potential competition aects a bidder's decision to enter an
auction, but has no direct eect on values. The second stage regression of all bids on auction
covariates and the estimated inverse Mills ratio from a rst stage probit of the decision to
participate shows a positive and signicant coecient on the inverse Mills ratio. This is
consistent with bidders being a selected sample of potential entrants.
The evidence presented in this section strongly suggests that the entry process is selective.
However, it does not pin down the degree of selection. Therefore, we now describe how we
estimate our model to measure the degree of selection.
4.3 Estimation Using Importance Sampling
To take the model to data, we need to specify how the parameters of the model may vary
across auctions, as a function of observed auction characteristics and unobserved heterogene-
ity. Both types of heterogeneity are likely to be important as the tracts we use dier greatly
in observed characteristics, such as sale value, size and wood type, and they also come from
dierent forests over several years so they may dier in other characteristics as well. Both
observed and unobserved (to the econometrician) heterogeneity may aect entry costs and
the degree of selection, as well as mean values.28
why mills are more likely than loggers to enter an auction.
28In the specication below,  is not a function of observables as when we allowed for this the estimated
eects of observables on the degree of selection were small and imprecise.
25Our estimation approach is based on Ackerberg (2009)'s method of simulated maximum
likelihood with importance sampling. We fully describe our estimation method in the ap-
pendix and in Roberts and Sweeting (2011). However, here we note several features of our
specication.
We assume that the parameters are distributed across auctions according to the following
distributions, where Xa is a vector of observed auction characteristics and TRN(;2;a;b) is
a truncated normal distribution with parameters  and 2, and upper and lower truncation
points a and b.
Location Parameter of Logger Value Distribution: a;logger  N(Xa1;!
2
;logger)
Dierence in Mill/Logger Location Parameters: a;mill   a;logger  TRN(Xa3;!
2
;di;0;1)
Scale Parameter of Mill and Logger Value Distributions: V a  TRN(Xa2;!
2
V ;0:01;1)
: a  TRN(4;!
2
;0;1)
Entry Costs: Ka  TRN(Xa5;!
2
K;0;1)
These specications reect our assumptions that V,  and K are the same for mills and
loggers within any particular auction, even though they may dier across auctions.
To apply the estimator, we also need to dene the likelihood function based on the open
outcry auction data. Two problems arise when interpreting these data. First, a bidder's
highest announced bid in an open outcry auction may be below its value, and it is not obvious
which mechanism leads to the bids that are announced (Haile and Tamer (2003)). Second, if
a rm does not know its value when taking the entry decision, it may learn (after paying the
entry cost) that its value is less than the reserve price and so not submit a bid. We take a
conservative approach (the details of which are provided in the appendix) when interpreting
the data by assuming that the winning bidder has a value greater than the second highest
bid, the second highest observed bid is equal to the value of the second-highest bidder, all
other bidders had values less than the highest observed bid and that potential entrants that
we do not see bid may or may not have paid the entry cost.
5 Empirical Results
In this section we present estimates of our structural model and counterfactual results mea-
suring the benets to the USFS of switching from the current simultaneous entry and simul-
taneous bid auction to our simple sequential process.
265.1 Parameter Estimates
Table 3 presents the parameter estimates for our structural model.29 We allow the USFS es-
timate of sale value and its estimate of logging costs to aect mill and logger values and entry
costs since these are consistently the most signicant variables in regressions of reserve prices
or winning bids on observables, including controls for potential entry. We also control for
species concentration since our discussions with industry experts lead us to believe that can
matter to rms. We allow for auction-level unobserved heterogeneity (to the econometrician)
in all parameters. The righthand columns show the mean and median values of the structural
parameters when we take 10 simulated draws of the parameters for each auction. For the
rest of the paper, we refer to these as the \mean" and \median" values of the parameters.
All standard errors are based on a non-parametric bootstrap, where both auctions and draws
are re-sampled, with 100 repetitions.
The coecients show that tracts with greater sale values and lower costs are more valu-
able, as one would expect. There is unobserved heterogeneity in values across auctions (the
standard deviation of logger) and some unobserved heterogeneity in the dierence between
mill and logger mean values across auctions (the standard deviation of mill   logger).
Based on the mean value of the parameters, the mean values of mills and loggers in the
population are, in 1983 dollars, $61.95/mbf and $42.45/mbf, respectively, a 46% dierence.
We estimate a mean entry cost of $2.05/mbf, also in 1983 dollars. One forester we spoke
with estimated modern day cruising costs of approximately $6.50/mbf, or $2.97/mbf in 1983
dollars. It is sensible that our estimate is less than the forester's estimate if rms in our data
are able to use any information they learn when deciding whether to enter other auctions.
Our estimates of the s across auctions indicate a moderate amount of selection in the
data. This is illustrated by the dierence in expected values for marginal and inframarginal
bidders in a representative auction where the reserve price and the number of potential mill
and logger entrants are set to their respective medians of $27.77/mbf, four and four. Based
on the mean parameter values, the expected values of a marginal and inframarginal mill
entrant are $45.22/mbf and $68.13/mbf, respectively (the former is lower than the population
average because most mills enter). The comparable numbers for loggers are $48.13/mbf and
$59.80/mbf, respectively.
Our estimation approach assumes that, if there are multiple equilibria, the rms will play
the equilibrium where mills have the lower S0. We can check whether our parameter esti-
mates can support multiple equilibria by plotting type-symmetric \equilibrium best response
functions" for mills and loggers for each auction. For each auction, our parameter estimates
29Roberts and Sweeting (2011) discuss alternative estimation methods that were attempted, such as Nested

































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































28support only a single equilibrium. This is because our estimates imply a large dierence in
the mean values of loggers and mills, relatively low entry costs and a moderate amount of
selection, all of which promote a unique equilibrium.
5.2 Counterfactual Results
Table 4 compares expected revenues and eciency from the sequential mechanism and the
simultaneous entry auction for a range of parameters and dierent numbers of rms. The sim-
ulations assume mills are approached rst (in a random order) followed by loggers, although
we have found some cases where a dierent order can strengthen the results below.
The rst line in Table 4 gives the results for the representative auction (four mills and four
loggers) based on the mean parameter estimates used in the constructing the gures above.
Relative to setting no reserve price in the simultaneous entry, simultaneous bid auction, the
sequential mechanism with no reserve price improves the USFS's revenues by 1.81%. For a
tract of average size (7,626 mbf) the expected revenue dierence would be $9,834.
The increase in revenues in this representative case of switching from the simultaneous
bid auction with no reserve price to the sequential mechanism with no reserve price is 9.05
times as large as the improvement from using an optimal reserve in the simultaneous bid
auction, which is just 0.2%. The nding that the revenue increase from using the sequential
mechanism is much larger than the returns to using a reserve price in the current auction
format is important since understanding optimal reserve price policies for timber auctions has
been the subject of signicant interest (examples include Mead, Schniepp, and Watson (1981),
Paarsch (1997), Haile and Tamer (2003), Li and Perrigne (2003) and Aradillas-Lopez, Gandhi,
and Quint (2010)). Additionally, the sequential mechanism provides an easily implementable
mechanism that does not require the USFS to possess detailed information on all of the
model's primitives. Such information would be required to set an optimal reserve price.
However, were the USFS to possess such information, a reserve price could also be set in the
sequential mechanism. If a reserve price is used in the sequential mechanism, the increase
in revenues becomes 10.43 times as large as the gain to setting an optimal reserve price in
the auction. This advantage would increase if we considered round-specic, optimal reserve
prices in the sequential mechanism.
Not only does the sequential mechanism have a much larger impact on revenues than does
setting an optimal reserve price in the standard auction format, it also increases eciency, as
shown in the penultimate column in Table 4. In the representative case given in the rst row
of the table, the USFS captures the majority of the increase in surplus, but expected rm
prots still increase in the sequential mechanism. As mentioned in Section 3, the sequential
























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































30expected prots. In the USFS auctions, switching from the current auction format to the
sequential mechanism tends to increase expected logger prots without substantially harming
those of mills. For example, in the representative case, expected logger prots increase 21%
when the sequential mechanism is used, while mill prots only fall by 0.60%.
The other rows in the table compare outcomes when we increase or decrease the number
of potential entrants or structural parameters by one standard deviation (the changing pa-
rameter is in italics), reecting the fact that our estimates imply that the coecients will
dier across sales. The cases we consider indicate that using the sequential mechanism gen-
erally raises expected revenues. In case 14 the entry cost is very low and in either mechanism
almost all rms participate so that revenues are essentially the same. In all cases, once a
constant reserve price is used in the sequential mechanism, it earns higher revenues than the
current auction format even with an optimal reserve price. We can see that setting a reserve
price in the standard auction format is particularly ineective when there are many potential
entrants or when entry is less selective ( is high). In all cases the sequential mechanism
increases eciency and in only one example does total bidder surplus fall (case 10). The
nding from the rst row that loggers benet from switching to the sequential mechanism
holds in all rows. Additionally, when expected mill prot falls, it tends to be by a small
amount, and in some cases it rises. As an example, in case 8, when di is low (0.169),
loggers' expected prot increases by 10.18% and mills' increases by 1.40%.
The USFS also uses rst price, sealed bid auctions to sell timber. We can also compare
the performance of the sequential mechanism to this alternative. Across all of the cases in
Table 4, with the exception of cases 6 and 14, a sequential mechanism with no reserve price
earns the USFS higher revenues than a rst price auction with an optimal reserve price.
Introducing a reserve price to the sequential mechanism increases its advantage over the rst
price auction by even more so that it now dominates in all cases.
While we believe that the simultaneous entry auction is the natural way to think about
how USFS auctions currently operate, we have also computed expected auction revenues
if, instead, rms enter sequentially (in the same order as the sequential mechanism) before
simultaneously submitting bids. For the representative auction, expected revenues in this case
are $71.84/mbf which is still less than the revenues from the sequential bidding mechanism.
This pattern holds more generally in the other rows in Table 4 where we were able to solve a
sequential entry auction game: in only two cases (6 and 14) did the sequential entry auction
give higher revenues than the sequential mechanism with no reserve price and in both cases
the dierences were small ($0.40/mbf and $0.06/mbf, respectively).30
30As explained in footnote 14, there is a high computational burden to solving the sequential entry auction
because it is necessary to solve for a threshold as a function of all possible histories of the game simultaneously.
For cases 3, 5, 13 and 15 we could not do so satisfactorily.
31Government sales and procurement programs often have distributional requirements that
a certain portion of contracts be awarded to targeted rms. The US federal government seeks
to award 23% of the $400 billion worth of annual contracts to small businesses (see Athey,
Coey, and Levin (2011) for additional discussion). The primary ways of favoring smaller
businesses are through set-asides, where only targeted rms can participate, and bid subsidies
for preferred rms. The USFS has historically used set-asides and recent work (Athey, Coey,
and Levin (2011)) suggests this may come at a substantial revenue and eciency loss relative
to using bid subsidies. In this light, our ndings that the USFS can increase revenues,
eciency and the prots of loggers with only small decreases in mill prots (and sometimes
increases) by switching from the current auction format to a sequential mechanism may be
particularly useful. Although a full comparison of bid subsidies, set-asides and the sequential
mechanism is beyond the scope of this paper, we see our ndings as suggesting that the
sequential mechanism may present procurement agencies with an eective alternative method
for allocating projects to targeted bidders. Additionally, the sequential mechanism requires
only that the agency be able to identify targeted rms, which is also required in the use of
set-asides and subsidies, and does not require determining optimal subsidy amounts or even
setting reserve prices. For timber auctions, we have been told by USFS ocials that they
believe that they can accurately identify the set of potential entrants for any given sale. Even
if at times they are unsure, it would be straightforward to allow potential participants to
costlessly identify themselves before the full details of a sale are announced.
Our discussion so far has largely ignored potential practical impediments to implementing
the sequential mechanism. First, were the USFS to use the sequential mechanism, there may
be concern that approaching rms in an order places some of them at an advantage over
others and may lead rms to try to aect the order in which they are approached. However,
for all of the examples that we have considered, expected rm prots are fairly constant
across the order of moves within bidder type, and there is no systematic pattern suggesting
that a particular spot in the order is best. Intuitively, while the rst potential entrant will be
more likely to participate, he also must pay more to win. For example, in the representative
auction, where the four mills are approached rst followed by the four loggers, the expected
prots (in $/mbf) by order are f6:07;6:09;6:14;6:18;1:08;1:05;1:09;1:04g. The maximum
amount by which expected mill (logger) prots dier in this case is 0.016 (0.042). Second,
there may be some concern about whether the USFS can commit to an order. However,
repeated use of the mechanism likely would incentivize the USFS to maintain its credibility
through consistent commitment to stated orders. Additionally, the lack of variation of prots
across spots in the order could mean that rm lobbying eorts, which might dissuade a seller
from sticking to a stated order, are likely to be small. Third, collusion may be a concern
32given the existing evidence from other USFS regions consistent with noncompetitive bidding
(Athey, Levin, and Seira (forthcoming)). However, as Bulow and Klemperer (2009) note
(their footnote 40), the \simple auction is perhaps more easily undermined, than a sequential
process, by collusion."
There may also be some concern that switching to the sequential mechanism would greatly
increase the time required to sell any stand of timber. While the length of the bidding process
would necessarily increase, we note that there is already a sizable gap (over a month) between
when a sale is announced and when it is completed.31 Since cruising takes between a day
and seven days, depending on the size of the sale, even in the extreme (assuming a large sale
in which 8 potential bidders all decide to participate), a sequential mechanism could be run
in under two months. Often the sequential process could happen much faster, but even an
extra month may be a small price to pay to realize the sequential mechanism's advantages.
We have also ignored the USFS's cost of switching to the sequential mechanism. Although
the cost of selling a stand of timber is likely to be similar across mechanisms, there may be a
xed cost associated with switching from the currently used format to a sequential process,
which would have to be measured against the potential gains from doing so. Based on the
15 cases in Table 4 alone, USFS revenues would increase by approximately $315,000 (in 2011
dollars) compared to using the current auction format with no reserve price.32 Given that
these 15 sales represent less than 0.3% of the tracts sold by the USFS in CA between 1982
and 1989, this one-time, sunk cost is likely to be small relative to the associated increase in
revenues.
6 Conclusion
This paper compares the performance of a sequential and a simultaneous bidding mechanism
in an environment where it is costly for potential buyers to participate and they receive
imperfectly-informative signals about their values prior to deciding whether to enter, so
that the entry process is selective. In contrast to results when there is no selection, a very
simple sequential mechanism can generate higher expected revenues for the seller than the
commonly used auction, and it also has an eciency advantage so that buyers may prefer
it is as well. The revenue result holds even though there is less entry (actual competition)
into the sequential mechanism. Instead, with selection, the sequential mechanism can do a
better job of allocating the good to the rm with the highest value and this fact, combined
31In fact the gap is usually much longer since the USFS must le documents to comply with the National
Environmental Policy Act.
32These calculations assume the average tract size in the 15 cases is 7,626 mbf.
33with the feature that rms with high values have to bid aggressively in an attempt to deter
future entry, provides its revenue advantage.
We view our results as relevant and important for at least three reasons. First, a selective
entry process is likely an appropriate description of many real-world settings where a bidding
process is used to sell an asset. This is because potential buyers often possess some pre-
existing knowledge of their match for the asset, but will need to conduct costly additional
research to determine how much they should be willing to pay. In these cases, our results
point to conclusions about how bidding should be structured that are dierent to those in
the existing literature. Our model also allows us to explain certain features of the data, such
as jump-bids not deterring all future entry in takeover contests, so that multiple jump bids,
sometimes by dierent rms, are observed (e.g., Betton and Eckbo (2000) or Betton, Eckbo,
and Thorburn (2008)). These facts cannot be explained by a model with no selection.
Second, the revenue dierences that we identify are not trivial. As a comparison, we
consider the seller's return to setting an optimal reserve price in a simultaneous auction,
which is the type of relative small design change that is the focus of the existing empirical
literature. For the representative auction in our data, we estimate that the seller's return to
switching to the sequential mechanism would be nine times greater than the return to setting
the optimal reserve price. The absolute dierence in revenues can also be large when entry
costs are higher or entry is more selective than we estimate to be the case in USFS auctions.
Third, our results are directly relevant to an on-going legal debate about how corporate
sales should be structured in order to allow boards to fulll their Revlon duties to maximize
shareholder value. At the very least, our results suggest that there are circumstances in
which a sequential bidding process will achieve this more eectively than a simultaneous one,
and they highlight two factors (entry costs and selection) on which the results are likely to
depend. One concern that has been raised with sequential processes is that all potential
buyers are not treated equally, so that rms that move rst may be able to deter later ones
and retain a right to match the prices oered by any later competition that emerges. This
is true in our model, but it does not necessarily mean that the rms that move rst earn
higher revenues. In fact, our results suggest that expected payos are fairly equal across the
order in the presence of selection, because early movers also pay entry costs more often and
are less likely to win when they enter.
One might believe that while simultaneous auctions often operate in exactly the way
modeled here, the stylized sequential mechanism that we consider is not widely implemented
in its exact form, perhaps suggesting that it is impractical or has some hidden disadvantage.
We do not believe this to be the case. The only thing that the seller needs to know is the set
of potential buyers, and in many cases it would be straightforward for these rms to identify
34themselves. The seller does need to be able to commit to approaching potential buyers in a
particular order, and to develop a system for distributing information about previous bids.
For many assets, any costs involved are likely to be small, and for a rm or government
agency involved in repeated transactions (e.g., procurement) they would be spread over a
large number of contracts. Instead, a more plausible reason for why the exact sequential
mechanism considered here is not used is that there are alternative sequential mechanisms
that can do even better, consistent with the fact that the seller optimal mechanism is almost
certainly some sort of sequential search process and that, within the sequential mechanism,
unlike the simultaneous auction, the ability to set a reserve price, and possibly other design
elements, can increase seller revenues substantially.
There are, of course, some limitations of the model that we consider here, which may be
important in some real-world settings. For example, our IPV assumption will not be satised
for assets where potential buyers have to form imperfect opinions about some innate future
potential. A common value component would change strategies signicantly in the sequential
mechanism as the incumbent bidder could signal that he believes the common value to be
low in order to deter entry. We also assume that rms act competitively, while the structure
of the selective mechanism might aect incentives for collusion on either entry decisions or
bids. Understanding how these factors would aect the relative performance of sequential
and simultaneous mechanisms appear to be protable directions for future research.
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38A Conditions for Unique Sequential Equilibrium Un-
der the D1 Renement
We now verify the three conditions for our equilibrium to be the unique sequential equilibrium





2 > 0. An increase in the signal threshold keeps out more second round potential
entrants. The bidding behavior of those entrants who have signals above the threshold is
unchanged and so an increase in S0
2 must strictly raise the incumbent's probability of winning








































Monotonicity requires that this expression is either always positive or always negative. We




@b1@v = 0. Consider two types of rst round bidders vH and vL, vH > vL, with
each considering increasing their bid b1 to b1 + ", " > 0. If the second bidder stays out then
the change in prots for each rst round type is the same,  ". We now show that if the
second round bidder enters the prot is still the same to each type of rst round bidder.
Consider three cases. (i) v2 < b1. The rst round bidder will pay b1 + " whatever his
value. (ii) v2 > b1 + ". The nal price will equal the value of the lower-valued rm and will
not depend on the rst round bid.33 (iii) b1  v2  b1 + ". The rst round bidder still wins,
regardless of type, but now he has to pay more since before he would have won at a price of
v2 but now he wins at a price of b1 + ", yielding the same cost of b1 + "   v2 to each type
of rst round bidder. Therefore, the cost of raising the deterring bid, all else constant, is





2@v > 0. To show that the benet of increasing the signal entry threshold is
33There are three cases within this case. The rst is when v2 > vH > vL. Regardless of deterring bid, both
rst round types would lose and so increasing the deterring bid has no eect on their prot. The second is
when vH > v2 > vL. Here the low type was going to lose regardless, and so it has no eect on his cost. Here
the high type was going to win but pay v2 no matter what and so increasing the bid has no eect on his
cost. The third is when vH > vL > v2. In either case both types were going to win but have to pay v2 and
so increasing the bid had no eect on either types' costs.
39greater the higher is the rst bidder's value, we can show that the benet of excluding any
second bidder type v2 is greater, the higher is the rst bidder type, regardless of v2. Consider
the value of excluding a second round bidder whose value is v2 for any two types of rst
round bidders vH and vL, vH > vL, both using deterring bid b1. If v2  b1 there is no change
in benet from exclusion for either rst bidder type. If b1 < v2 there are three cases. (i)
v2  vL < vH. In this case the benet of excluding the second round bidder is v2   b1 for
each rst round bidder type. (ii) vL < v2  vH. In this case the benet of exclusion is
vL   b1 for the low type and v2   b1 for the high type. Since by assumption v2 > vL, the
benet of exclusion is greater for the higher type. (iii) vL < vH < v2. In this case the benet
of exclusion is vL   b1 for the low type and vH   b1 for the high type and so the benet
is greater for the higher rst bidder type. Therefore, the benet of excluding more second









@b1 < 0. Increasing the bid is costly when it does not aect the second round
potential entrant's decision. In particular, it reduces a rm's payo when the second round
rm does not enter or it enters and has a value less than b1. If the potential entrant enters
with a value above b1 then changing b1 has no eect.


























@b1 | {z }
<0
> 0 (6)
and so the monotonicity condition is satised.
(3) S0
2 is uniquely dened for any belief about the rst potential entrant's value, and the
potential entrant's response is more favorable to the incumbent when the potential entrant
thinks that the incumbent's value is higher. This is true since S0
2 is a continuous function of
the second period potential entrant's belief about the incumbent's value (reecting the zero
prot condition, as in equation 4, and the potential entrant's beliefs about his own value as
a function of its signal) and the second potential entrant will increase S0
2 if he believes bidder
1's type is higher because his expected prots are decreasing in bidder 1's type for any signal
he receives.
40B Details of Estimation Method
In this appendix we more fully describe our estimation procedure based on Ackerberg (2009)'s
method of simulated maximum likelihood with importance sampling.
This method involves solving a large number of games with dierent parameters once,
calculating the likelihoods of the observed data for each of these games, and then re-weighting
these likelihoods during the estimation of the distributions for the structural parameters. This
method is attractive when it is believed that the parameters of the model are heterogeneous
across auctions and it would be computationally prohibitive to re-solve the model (possibly
many times in order to integrate out over the heterogeneity) each time one of the parameters
changes.34
To apply the method, we assume that the parameters are distributed across auctions
according to the specication given in Section 4.3. These specications reect our assump-
tions that V,  and K are the same for mills and loggers within any particular auction,
even though they may dier across auctions. The lower bound on V a is set slightly above
zero simply to avoid computational problems that were sometimes encountered when there
was almost no dispersion of values. Our estimated specications also assume that the var-
ious parameters are distributed independently across auctions. This assumption could be
relaxed, although introducing a full covariance matrix would signicantly increase the num-
ber of parameters to be estimated and, when we have tried to estimate these parameters, we
have not found these coecients to be consistently signicant across specications. The set






particular draw of the parameters fa;logger;a;mill;V a;a;Kag is denoted .
Denoting the outcome for an observed auction by ya, the log-likelihood function for a








where La(yaj) is the likelihood of the outcome y in auction a given structural parameters ,
(jXa; ) is the pdf of the parameter draw  given  , our distributional assumptions, the
unique equilibrium strategies implied by our equilibrium concept and auction characteristics
including the number of potential entrants, the reserve price and observed characteristics Xa.
Unfortunately, the integral in (7) is multi-dimensional and cannot be calculated exactly.
34Bajari, Hong, and Ryan (2010) use a related method to analyze entry into a complete information entry
game with no selection.








where g(jXa) is the importance sampling density whose support does not depend on  ;
which is true in our case because the truncation points are not functions of the parameters.









where s is one of S draws from g(jXa). Critically, this means that we can calculate La(yajs)
for a given set of S draws that do not vary during estimation, and simply change the weights
(sjXa; )
g(sjXa) , which only involves calculating a pdf when we change the value of   rather than
re-solving the game.
This simulation estimator will only be accurate if a large number of s draws are in
the range where (sjXa; ) is relatively high, and, as is well known, simulated maximum
likelihood estimators are only consistent when the number of simulations grows fast enough
relative to the sample size. We therefore proceed in two stages. First, we estimate   using S =
2;500 draws, where g() is a multivariate uniform distribution over a large range of parameters
which includes all of the parameter values that are plausible. Second, we use these estimates
b   to repeat the estimation using a new importance sampling density g(jXa) = (sjXa;b  )
with S = 500 per auction. Roberts and Sweeting (2011) provide Monte Carlo evidence that
the estimation procedure works well even for smaller values of S.
To apply the estimator, we also need to dene the likelihood function La(yaj) based on
the data we observe about the auction's outcome, which includes the number of potential
entrants of each type, the winning bidder and the highest bids announced during the open
outcry auction by the set of rms that indicated that they were willing to meet the reserve
price. Two problems arise when interpreting these data. First, a bidder's highest announced
bid in an open outcry auction may be below its value, and it is not obvious which mechanism
leads to the bids that are announced (Haile and Tamer (2003)). Second, if a rm does not
know its value when taking the entry decision, it may learn (after paying the entry cost) that
its value is less than the reserve price and so not submit a bid.
We therefore make the following assumptions (Roberts and Sweeting (2011) present es-
timates based on alternative assumptions about the data generating process that deliver
similar results) that are intended to be conservative interpretations of the information that
is in the data: (i) the second highest observed bid (assuming one is observed above the re-
42serve price) is equal to the value of the second-highest bidder; 35 (ii) the winning bidder has
a value greater than the second highest bid; (iii) both the winner and the second highest
bidder entered and paid Ka; (iv) other rms that indicated that they would meet the reserve
price or announced bids entered and paid Ka and had values between the reserve price and
the second highest bid; and, (v) all other potential entrants may have entered (paid Ka) and
found out that they had values less than the reserve, or they did not enter (did not pay Ka).
If a rm wins at the reserve price we assume that the winner's value is above the reserve
price.
35Alternative assumptions could be made. For example, we might assume that the second highest bidder
has a value equal to the winning bid, or that the second highest bidder's value is some explicit function of his
bid and the winning bid. In practice, 96% of second highest bids are within 1% of the high bid, so that any
of these alternative assumptions give similar results. We have computed some estimates using the winning
bid as the second highest value and the coecient estimates are indeed similar.
43